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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

EMPLOYER'S

RIGHT TO

GIVE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE

SPEECHES

The law relating to the right of an employer to make anti-union
speeches to a "captive audience" (i.e. speeches on the employer's property
and time, which employees are required to attend) has been in an uncertain status for a considerable period of time.
It is quite clear that an employer may express anti-union views to his
employees, provided his statements or conduct as a whole are not threatening or coercive within the meaning of section 8 (a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act.'
But when there is added the factor of a captive audience, The National
Labor Relations Board has been unable to chart a consistent course.

In

Clark Bros. Co. 2 the Board ruled for the first time that such a speech, in
itself, is an unfair labor practice under section 8 (a) (1) . In the subsequent
enforcement proceeding,3 the Circuit Court, by way of dictum, suggested
a captive audience speech would not automatically constitute an unfair
practice if the union had been afforded an equal opportunity to address
the employees.
The decision was strongly criticized by Congress as restricting too
greatly the employer's right of speech, 4 and the Labor Management Relations Act, passed in 1947, contained an entirely new section, 8 (c), which
provided, "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat
' 5
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
This was apparently intended to overrule the Clark Bros. case, and in
Babcock & Wilcox Co.6 the Board so held, declaring that compulsory attendance at an anti-union speech did not in itself constitute an unfair labor
practice. However, the union had not requested an opportunity to answer,
1.

2.
3.
4.

49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.s.c. sec. 158 (1946), as amended 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. sec. 158(a) (1) (Supp. 1951). NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314
U.S. 469, 477, 62 S. Ct. 344, 86 L. Ed. 348 (1941); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 539, 63 S. Ct. 1214, 87 L. Ed. 1568 (1943); NLRB v. American
Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993, 146 A.L.R. 1017 (2d Cir., 1943), cert. denied 320
U.S. 768, 64 S.Ct. 84, 88 L. Ed. 459 (1943); NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 166 F.2d 485
(6th Cir., 1948).
70 N. L. R. B. 802 (1946).
NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
"The Board has placed a limited construction upon these decisions [Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) and NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993
(2d Cir. 1943), declaring right of free speech in labor matters] by holding such
speeches by employers to be coercive . . . if the speech was made in the plant on

working time (Clark Bros., 70 N. L. R. B. 802).
The committee believes these
decisions to be too restrictive and in this section [8 (c) ], provides that if, under all
the circumstances, there is neither an expressed or implied threat of reprisal, force,
or offer of benefit, the Board shall not predicate any finding of unfair labor practice

5.
6.

upon the statement." Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23 (1947).
49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. 158 (1946), as amended 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
U. S. C. A. 158 (c) (Supp. 1951).
77 N. L. R. B. 577 (1948).
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so that point was not in issue. Subsequently in S & S Corrugated Paper
Machinery Co.,7 in which the union had requested and been denied an
opportunity to reply, it was held on the authority of the Babcock case that
such opportunity to reply need not be given.
Thus it appeared for a time that section 8 (c) had ended the captive
audience doctrine entirely. But it was soon revived by Bonwit Teller, Inc.8
In this case the employer made an anti-union speech to a captive audience
six days before an election to determine whether the employees would
accept or reject union representation. At the time the store prohibited
union solicitation on the selling floor at any time, and a subsequent request
by the union for an opportunity to address the employees under similar
conditions was not granted.
The Board held that, under the circumstances, this constituted an
unfair labor practice. The decision was based on two grounds, the first
being the denial of the union's request was discriminatory application of
the no-solicitation rule. Only because Bonwit Teller was a department
store was it allowed to forbid union solicitation on the selling floors during
non-working as well as working hours. The Board felt this special privilege
given to the store placed upon it an obligation to assure that the rule
was enforced with an even hand. For an employer, in the face of such a
rule, to utilize its premises for the purpose of urging its employees to reject
the Union, and then to deny the Union's request to present its case to the
employees under the same circumstances, is an abuse of that privilege .. "
The other ground relied on was that, without regard for the no-solicitation rule, the refusal of the union's request deprived the employees of their
right guaranteed by section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act 9
to freely select or reject union representation, as that right includes the
right to hear both sides under conditions reasonably approximating equality.
The Second Circuit affirmed the Board's order,' 0 but stated the determinative feature was the discriminatory application of the no-solicitation
rule. "If Bonwit Teller were to abandon that rule, we do not think it would
then be required to accord the Union a similar opportunity to address the
employees each time Rudolph [Bonwit Teller president] made an antiunion speech."
Despite this statement by the Court, the Board has tended toward
almost automatic declarations that captive audience speeches constitute
unfair labor pracices, with virtually no inquiry into the other circumstances
in each case.
7.

89 N. L. R. B. 1363 (1950).

9.

49 Stat. 452 (1935),

8. 96 N. L. R. B. 608 (1951).
10.

29 U. S. C. 157 (1946),

u. S. C. A. 157 (Supp. 1951).

as amended 61 Stat. 140 (1947),

Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952).
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Thus, in one case"' the Board applied the rule of the Bonwit Teller
case even though the employer did not maintain a no-solicitation rule.
Chairman Herzog, dissenting, objected to the extension of the Bonwit Teller
doctrine "beyond the limits thought permissible by the reviewing Court."
The Board found another captive audience speech to be an unfair labor
practice even though the union did not ask for an equal opportunity to
address the employees (Chairman Herzog again dissented). The Board
did state, however, that under the circumstances (employer gave his speech
so late that no further meetings could be held before the election), the
employer had in effect denied the union a chance to reply, and thus prevented the employees from hearing both sides of the story under reasonably
2
equal circumstances.'
The Board now seems to have formulated a general test that whenever
a company makes "anti-union speeches to its employees during working
hours on its premises in the course of an organizing campaign by a labor
organization without according, upon reasonable request, a similar opportunity to address its employees to the labor organization against which such
speeches are directed" it commits an unfair labor practice.' 3
Chairman Herzog has been the lone dissenter to the mechanical application of such a rule. His position he stated clearly in the National Screw
& Manufacturing Co. case:' 4
"I am compelled to disagree with what seems to me an undiscriminating extension of the Bonwit Teller doctrine. When I
joined in the Bonwit decision, I thought that the application of
that doctrine was to depend, as we said there, upon the particular
circumstances of each individual case. I thought the criterion
to be whether employees had had a resaonable opportunity to hear
both sides of the story under circumstances which reasonably
approximate equality, rather than that our judgment would depend simply and automatically upon whether an employer who
uses his premises to make a speech had refused identical facilities
to a labor organization."
Inasmuch as no cases have reached the courts since Bonwit Teller, the
ultimate decision as to which view will prevail must await further court
proceedings. In the meantime, any conjecture as to what will be decided
seems unwarranted.
WARD A. WHITE
11.
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Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc.; Massachusetts Motor Car Co., Inc., 102 N. L. R. B.
No. 171 (1953).
Foreman & Clark, Inc., 101 N. L. R. B. No. 12 (1952).
Onondago Pottery Co., 103 N. L. R. B. No. 75 (1953); see also Seamprufe, Inc.,
103 N. L. R. B. No. 17 (1953).
101 N. L. F. B. No. 218 (1952).

